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Book Review
EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM. By Michael A. Rebel1 and Arthur R. Block.
'Chicago, Illinois, The University of Chicago Press 1982. Pp.
xv, 319. $27.50.
Reviewed by James J. Fishman*
"Thou shall not sit
With statisticians nor commit
A social science"'

I. Educational Policymaking in the Courts
For over twenty years the common wisdom has been that
legal realism is dead.a Educational Policymaking and the
Courts: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activisms by Michael
A. ~ e b e l and
l
Arthur R. Block makes rumors of legal realism's
death exaggerated.' This is not the place to argue whether legal
realism is a philosophy, a movement, a creed, or a schoolP At the
very least it is a method of undertaking research, of using the
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. AB., A.M., University
of Pennsylvania; J.D., PhD., New York University.
1. Auden, Under Which Lyre. in COUCTEDSHORTER
POEMS
225 (1966).
2. See Gilmore, Legal Realism, Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALEL.J. 1037 (1961);
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALOL. REV. 459 (1979); Note, 'Round And 'Round The Bramble Bush:
From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV.L. REV. 1669. 1676 (1982).
EDUCATIONAL
POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS:AN EMPIRI3. M. REBELL& A. BLOCK,
CAL STUDY
OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM
(1982) [hereinafter cited as REBELL & BLOCK].
4. This is a paraphrase of Mark Twain's comment: "The report of my death was an
exaggeration." J. BARTLEIT,FAMILUR
QUOTATIONS
763a (14th ed. 1968) (quoting a cablegram sent from London by Mark Twain to the Associated Press on June 2, 1897).
5. See generally K . LLEWELLYN,
THECOMMON
LAWTRADITION
508-18 (1960) [hereinafter cited as COMMON
LAW];Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV.L. REV. 1222 (1930-1931) [hereinafter cited as Some Realism];see
also Schlegel, supra note 2.
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techniques of the social sciences to better understand the judicial p r o c e s ~ .Educational
~
Policymaking and the Courts is a
unique attempt to relate significant empirical data to arguments
raised in the controversy over judicial activism by subjecting a
broad survey of representative educational areas, two in depth
judicial case studies, and two comparative legislative case studies to a common theoretical framework. The authors analyze the
role of courts in educational policymaking in an effort to determine whether the judiciary has the capacity and authority
within traditional constitutional doctrines of the separation of
powers to resolve social policy issues through intervention into
the policymaking process.
The involvement of courts in educational matters has resulted in a cottage industry of law review articles, student notes,
and comments. With but a very few exceptions, this scholarship
has taken Auden's quip to heart. It has focused either on the
analysis of the constitutional legal doctrines involved, reviews of
the West Publishing Company's advance sheets, or in a few instances, in-depth atheoretical case studies of significant educational litigation. There has been little research which systematically investigates actual judicial practices and integrates relevant
legal theory with such empirical findings. Rebell and Block have
attempted to bridge that gap. To report that they are but partially successful is nonetheless a substantial accomplishment.

11. The Theoretical Framework: The Judicial Activism
Controversy
In the first chapter Rebell and Block present an overview of
the intellectual debate over judicial activism and the court's role
in p~licymaking.~
While the judiciary has become involved in complex institutional reforms of other areas of modern life besides education:
6. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV.809, 821-34 (1935); Some Realism, supra note 5, at 1236-37, 1240-41, 1244-45,
Note, supra note 2, at 1674-76.
7. The discussion is conducted on a high intellectual level and is somewhat abstruse,
except for those who are teachers or etudenta of constitutional law.
8. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ale. N.D. 1976) (prison systems);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.Ala. N.D. 1972) (state mental health
systems).
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educational policy litigation has been a prime focus of the "judicial activism" controversy. According to Professor Abram
Chayes, increasing involvement of the judiciary in institutional
reform and policymaking has led to a new kind of law~uit.~
Whereas the traditional lawsuit is bipolar, involving a contest
between two individuals or entities with diametrically opposed
interests wherein the impact of the court's judgment is confined
to the immediate parties, this new model of public law litigation
is multipolar, involving numerous parties and points of view,
with broad remedial decrees which are often negotiated by the
parties. The court's decree often has important consequences for
many outside the courtroom. In institutional reform litigation
"[tlhe subject matter of the lawsuit is often not a dispute between private individuals about private rights, but a grievance
about the operation of public policy."1°
The authors use Professor Chayes' model of the new public
law litigation as a framework within which to examine four controversies in the judicial activism debate. They divide the issues
into two basic categories: 1) legitimacy - whether judicial involvement in policymaking is in keeping with the courts' proper
role within the American separation of powers system; and 2)
capacity - whether the judiciary can handle capably the new
responsibilities it has assumed." Critics of judicial activism
claim that the courts have far exceeded their role under the separation of powers as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution.lS Defenders of judicial activism have responded that this
activism is not antidemocratic but provides an important element of popular sovereignty, and that the Constitution is a body
of "fundamental law" established for the specific purpose of insuring that basic individual rights and liberties would not be
compromised by the tyranny of the majority operating through
the legislature.ls The political debate, say the authors,'' has
9. Chayea, The Role of the Judge in Atblic Law Litigation, 89 WV.
L. REV. 1281,
1282 (1976).
10. Id. at 1302.
11. REaELL & BLOCK.
supra note 3, at 4.
12. See, e.g., R. BERDER,
GOVERNBY JUDICIARY
249-50 (1977).
13. See Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV.
903,914-16 (1976); Lavi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 371,
374-78 (1976).
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been paralleled in the more rarified area of legal scholarship by a
discussion articulated in terms of "principlelpolicy" issues:
whether courts should be limited to deciding cases on the basis
of strict legal principles or should be free to engage in broader
policy deliberations. Those favoring the "principle" approach
prefer a more limited traditional role within the separation of
powers scheme.'" Supporters of the broader policy approach accept and encourage more judicial activism within the policymaking arena normally the domain of the other branches of
government.
On still another plateau, the principlelpolicy distinction can
be viewed as a jurisprudential debate between the instrumentalism of legal realism - its openness to a judicial role in policymaking, and receptivity to the use of social science evidence
by the courts - and the "principled" approach of Professor
Wechsler, later adapted by Professor Dworkin.l6 Both Wechsler
and Dworkin insist that judicial decisions be based on "neutral
principles" of law, but Dworkin argues that the sources of "principles" are broader." These sources are sufficiently rich to provide a single right answer to every hard case. Dworkin believes
that judges should not decide policy issues but should base their
rulings on principles even if such rulings have substantial social
or political implications. He claims his approach fits much of
contemporary judicial activism into a "principled" mold.18 The
authors agree with Dworkin that while the line between principle and policy is difficult to establish, the division can be made.
Further, the way judges perceive their role and formally justify
their decisions and the manner in which the parties present
14. REBELL & BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 7.
15. In Nixonian days, this group was known by the label "strict constructionists."
16. REBBU & BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 8-9. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L. FW.1 (1959); Yudof, School Desegregation:
Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme
Court, 42 LAW& CONTEMP.PROBS.57 (1978). Profeasor Dworkin insists that judicial decisions be based upon neutral principles of law. But, he takes a different view of what ie
encompassed by law. Legal righta therefore may be based on a discrete set of precedents
and statutes and also on justifying principles devised from institutional structures,
morals, and political theories integrating the two. REBELL& BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 8-9.
See Dworkin, Hard Coses, 88 HARV.L. REV. 1057 (1975).
supra note 3, at 8-9.
17. ELL & BLOCK,
18. See Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201, 1237 (1977).
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their claims, although not providing incontrovertible distinctions
between principle and policy, constitute important behavioral
data.'@Thus, in their analysis of education cases the authors attempt to determine the degree to which parties justified their
claims and defenses and the courts explained their decisions on the basis of principle or policy.*O Rebel1 and Block focus upon
two questions in analyzing the judiciary's factfinding capabilities: 1) to what extent were the courts able to obtain the necessary information; and 2) how effectively did the judges deal with
and comprehend the social science data presented to them?
Related to the legitimacy debate is the question whether the
parties in the new public law litigation are sufficiently representative of the interests affected by a court ~ r d e r . ~In' the traditional separation of powers view, the legislature is the primary
repository for the articulation of public policy issues because it
theoretically represents all parties. To the extent that courts engage in public policy issues their legitimacy is affected, particularly if the litigants speak only for themselves and large numbers
affected are unrepresented in the litigation.**
To test whether all those having a substantial interest in the
cases studied were represented in the court proceedings, Rebell
and Block attempt to answer the question empirically by determining: 1)were most social policy lawsuits in federal courts filed
by minority plaintiffs; 2) to what extent were class action procedures used to argue the depth of representation; 3) to what extent did the party structure follow the broad breadth of representation implied in Chayes' theory; and 4) were there any
indications that in a significant number of cases litigated by the
public interest advocacy, lawyers remained unresponsive to their
19. REBELL& BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 33.
20. Principle is defined as "[a] statement establishing a right of an individual
against the state or against another individual (or, less frequently, the right of an institution to maintain the integrity of ita legally defined prerogatives)." RBBELL & BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 23.
A policy is "[a] statement concerning collective goals. Policy arguments consider the
relative importance or desirability of particular social goals, andlor the relative efficiency
and desirability of particular methods for achieving such goals." Id. at 24.
21. Id. at 9. See D. H o ~ o w mTHE
,
COURTSAND SOCIAL
POLICY
49-50 (1977); Bell,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideab and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALEL.J. 470, 491 (1976).
22. RESELL& BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 9.
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clients' interests?
In addition to the legitimacy of court activism, the debate
on the judiciary's proper role has focused upon "the comparative
ability of the courts to deal effectively and efficiently with social
problems that traditionally were handled exclusively by the legIs the factfinding proislative and administrative bran~hes."~~
cess of litigation suited for the complex data gathering needed to
"discover the truth"? Critics of judicial activism have argued
that even if courts were able to obtain sufficient social science
data, they would be untrained to fully understand and assimilate it.
The most striking aspect of the new public law litigation
model is the remedial decree which provides for a complex ongoing regime of performance involving the court in detailed supervision of the implementation of new policies and practices. Thie
surveillance is often protracted as a result of resistance to the
implementation of the decree.%'
The remedial decree is at the core of the new public law
litigation. It is at this remedy stage that the breadth of those
affected first may be dis~erned.'~
The issue of judicial intrusiveness into the legislative and executive domain becomes central
at this plateau. Broad remedial decrees have been criticized because they involve courts in administrative or legislative responsibilities for which they are ill-suited. The authors measure the
extent of judicial intrusion into the local policymaking process
by classifying all of the cases where the plaintiffs prevailed into
categories of reform decree and self-executing judgments.'@ They
also study party participation in the formulation of the decree,
the use of monitoring mechanisms, and the effectiveness of court
inter~ention.~~
23. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
24. Chayea, supra note 9, at 1298-1302. See also Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM.L. REV.784, 813-42 (1978).
supra note 3, at 58.
25. ReeeL~& BLOCK,
26. Id. at 59.
27. Id. at 61.
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111. Methodology
Rebel1 and Block have undertaken a prodigious amount of
research. They have systematically examined sixty-five federal
trial court proceedings decided between 1970 and 1977 which attempted to change system-wide practices, policies, or rules in
the public schools.a8They have interviewed 130 attorneys for the
principal parties in sixty of the sixty-five cases. Finally they
have organized their research to empirically test the four issues
in the judicial activism debate: first, did courts decide issues in
terms of legal principles thus acting within the proper sphere of
judicial decisionmaking or did they reach decisions on the basis
of policymaking thereby, as their critics would say, intruding
into the responsibilities of other branches of government; second, were those with a substantial interest in the controversy
represented in court proceedings; third, did the judiciary have
the capability to engage in comprehensive factfinding and analysis; and finally, did courts have the ability to devise and implement appropriate remedies?aBExcluded from their sample are
non-public school cases and all of the school desegregation cases
decided during the time frame selected. The authors believe that
the excluded categories have been subject to substantial doctrinal and empirical analysis and want to cover the largest number
of cases without necessarily duplicating work done by others.a0
The omission of desegregation cases, containing issues which
have so inflamed the public if not the commentators over the
role of the court, is unfortunate, for it diminishes the authors'
conclusions.
The sample includes the full universe of published decisions
during the time frame selected, rather than a stratified sample
including cases selected randomly from categories within the total universe. Fifty-one percent of the cases involved regulation of
These cases are not only dated,
student speech and cond~ct.~'
they may be more typical of classical bipolar litigation. Further28. Id. at 63.
29. Id. at 65.
30. Id. at 221.
31. The authors correctly suggest that the grooming cases, all of which occurred
from 1970 to 1973, were proxy wars reflecting views on the Vietnam conflict and on the
counterculture. Id. at 27.
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more, several unanswered questions rise to the surface: has educational policymaking changed over time as courts have become
more accustomed to such cases; do the authors find that there is
any statistically significant difference in earlier cases from the
later ones in their sample; are the results statistically significant
in terms of relevance to the judicial activism debate? The authors admit that the degree of confidence of their inferences
could be questioned, but they claim that if they applied a formal
statistical test, there would be a confidence level of ninety-five
percent.sa This test could not be done because of the nature of
the sample. The authors state that the primary reason the
reader should believe the validity of their conclusions is that
they are based on well informed judgments. This is not an altogether satisfactory answer.

IV. The Case and Legislative Studies
To illustrate in greater detail the quantitatively based findings and to expand upon them with more qualitative analysis,
Rebel1 and Block undertake comprehensive studies of two complex federal cases, Chance v. Board of Examinersss and Otero u.
Mesa County Valley School District No. 51." Heeding the
warning of Professor Donald Horowitz to be "chary of drawing
inferences about the courts without an institutionally compara~ ~ authors also undertake two detive frame of r e f e r e n ~ e , "the
tailed studies of the New York and Colorado legislative approaches to educational policy problems similar to those in the
32. Id. at 226. The confidence level is the certainty that the conclusion or result is
not due to the randomness or normal occurrence. The confidence level of 95% ie used to
prove or disprove hypotheses. The authors stak.
This estimation rule [the 95% confidence level] cannot be applied to observations
of our sample without important qualifications - namely, that the sample we are
studying was not drawn strictly at random, and that the population from which
the sample was drawn did not consist of homogeneous, independent unite (since
earlier court decisions affect later court decisions).
Id. at 308 n.21. See 2 K. YEOMANS,
STATISTICS
FOR THE SOCUL
SCIENTIST
38-43 (1970).
33. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd,458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 496
F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), reu'd, 561 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1977).
34. 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975), reh'g denied, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1978).
on remand, 470 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo.l979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1980).
35. REBELL& BLOCK,supra note 3, at 73 (quoting D. HOROWITZ,
THECOURTSAND
SOCIAL
POLICY18 (1977)).
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judicial case studies. These federal cases and legislative approaches provide a fascinating comparative analysis as to how
different institutions approach common issues.
Chance v. Board of Examiners was brought on behalf of a
class of black and Puerto Rican educators who alleged that the
traditional examination system used to license principals and
other supervisors in the New York City public school system was
racially discriminatory. After issuance of a preliminary injunction in 1971, and a final judgment based on a consent decree of
two of the parties in 1972, the compliance stage of the litigation
continued for another six years! It involved the court in such
issues as validation of standardized tests, definition of qualifications for educational leadership, parental involvement in the hiring and evaluation process, and affirmative action requirements
for staff layoffs. Although the second circuit ordered the district
court to terminate its jurisdiction, at least one court litigations6
and another federal case based on related issues persist today.s7
Otero v. Mesa County Valley involved a class action complaint on behalf of Mexican-American parents and school age
children residing in a Colorado rural town. The suit alleged that
the school district's educational program and hiring practices
discriminated against Chicanos. Plaintiffs requested that the
court institute a comprehensive bilingual/bicultural curriculum
and require affirmative action hiring programs.
The New York legislative study involved a teacher seniority-layoff bill considered in 1976 which addressed several issues
relating to teacher demands as opposed to concerns of supervisory professionals raised in the Chance litigation. The Colorado
study centered on that state's legislature's deliberations in 1975
over a bilingual/bicultural educational program, an ideal counterpoint to the issues presented in Otero. In New York the
Chance court granted plaintiffs claim, but the legislature did
not pass the seniority-layoff bill. In Colorado, after an acrimonious trial, the Otero court entered judgment for the defendants
on all counts, however, the Colorado legislature passed a broad
bilinguaVbicultural program. Chance differed from Otero not
36. See Elsberg v. Board of Educ., 99 Misc. 2d 1101, 418 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1979).
37. See Macchiarola v. Board of Examiners, No. 81 Civ. 4798 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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only in the judgment. In the former, negotiations between the
parties were harmonious; discovery remarkably efficient. In
Otero relationships were acrimonious and factfinding disputed
throughout the trial. The thrust of Chance was in its protracted
remedial phase; in Otero the important focus was on liability
factfinding.
Otero was an example of how not to bring complex and controversial educational litigation. Even the plaintiffs attorney admitted the case should not have been brought in the district of
Grand Junction which was conservative and not accustomed to
dealing with this type of racial issue.88 If there was any positive
aspect to this lawsuit, it was the cultural and political awakening
of the Chicano community and the realization by Anglo educators that they had to take into account the cultural aspirations
of Hispanic students. Whether this is the proper function of a
court, however, is not addressed in this study.
One of the most significant aspects of this book is the finding which disputes the common assumption concerning the superiority of legislative as opposed to judicial factfinding capabilities. Both legislatures - New. York, where each legislator has
some research capacity, and Colorado, where research capability
is allied to the committee structure - reveal a lack of capacity
for systematic or analytical fact analysis. Legislative hearings
constituted a showcase function: the facts accumulated were not
scrutinized by the legislators and did not appear to have had
major impact on the final outcome.8s
Moreover, in the legislative area there is no mechanism for
compelling efficient discovery. A court can compensate for lack
of staff by requiring the parties to submit necessary evidence. In
the legislative process there are neither the resources nor the interest in such information. The legislature by nature of its political approach is more inclined toward avoiding basic social fact
issues and data assessment.
In terms of the capacity to consider broad comprehensive
implications of major reforms, courts and legislatures are subject
to similar strengths and weaknesses. In both fora the interested
parties work out the details of the remedy. The authors conclude
38. REBELL& BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 282 n.11.
39. Id. at 194.
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that there appears to be no basis for arguing that the courts are
less capable of comprehensively structuring complex systematic
reforms than the legi~lature.'~That may seem less of an issue,
however, than whether the courts should shape these comprehensive reforms.

V. Major Conclusions
In sixty-four of the sixty-five cases the complaints contained
at least one claim grounded in the form of "principle". Nearly
all of plaintiffs' attorneys framed their complaints in a form of
an allegation based upon constitutional rights, so necessary to
standing in federal district court. The obviousness of this approach recalls Derek Bok's aside: "All research corrupts but empirical research corrupts ab~olutely."~~
However predictable this
conclusion may seem, a function of empirical research is to look
for laws or connections among facts in order to explain and to
predict. Only by building up such basic generalizations can we
obtain more valid conclusion^.^^
Professor Dworkin has been criticized for the intricate distinctions he has drawn between principles and policies, because
they are so ephemeral that they serve simply as a shield protecting-activist judges from charges of usurpation.'$ The authors
find that they can not categorize all of their cases as "policy" or
"principle" because their primary principle can be applied in individual disputes without substantive consideration of certain
limited policy arguments." Consequently, the authors develop a
third category of qualified principle; for instance, in student
grooming cases when the plaintiff would argue principle, judges
would have to consider the validity of the defendant administrator's claims that ruling for the plaintiff would lead to disruption
40. Id. at 210.
41. D. BOK,THEPRESIDENT'S
REPORT 1981-82, at 6 (Report to Overseers of Harv. U.
1983).
42. See READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
6-11 (M. Bradbeck ed.
1968).
43. Creenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. Rev. 991, 1036
(1977).
44. R&BBLL & BLOCK,
supra note 3, at 24.
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of the educational program. Eighty percent of all of the cases
fall into this intertwined principlelpolicy category. The authors
find this result "striking and unexpe~ted"'~and admit that critics and proponents of judicial activism have viable arguments.
The authors further split hairs by concluding that what is significant in such cases is not whether policy arguments are ever involved in court decisions, but whether the crux of the case involves a matter of principle that properly belonged before the
courts.4e Interestingly, when the courts, as opposed to the researchers characterized the case as based upon policy grounds,
the defendant school board won each time.

B. Interest Representation Issues
The study confirms the prevalent assumption that most educational policy litigations are brought by minorities." One reason for this may be that the courts provide better access to minority aspirations than the legislature, which often treats
minorities as just one more interest group.
A criticism of institutional reform litigation is that the
plaintiffs speak only for themselves, yet a broader group having
a direct stake in the outcome of the lawsuit is unrepresented.
Rebel1 and Block assume that depth of representativeness can
be ascertained by determining whether cases were filed as class
actions. The authors state that class action status is significant
since it can serve as a barometer of plaintiffs' intentions to
speak for a broader group of individuals interested in policy reform.J8 Other reasons, however, come to mind. Attorneys' fees
and general litigation strategy may promote the class action
technique in institutional reform litigation since the defendants
will have a greater incentive to settle before trial.
A significant finding in the survey is that judges tend either
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id. at 201.
47. Fifty-six percent of the cases sampled were brought by suspect and "semi-suspect" classes. Minority plaintiffs were successful in 71% of the cases.
Semi-suspect classes include disadvantaged groups treated more recently by statutes
and court decisions as disadvantaged minorities in need of special protection, even
though the Supreme Court has not explicitly identified them as suspect classes. The authors include in this category: females, handicapped, poor, and elderly. Id. at 36.
48. Id. at 37.
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to delay the classification of the litigation as a class action or
ignore such claims. The corollary of this finding is the judiciary's
failure to provide the protective mechanisms of Rule 23'" which
hold plaintiffs' attorneys responsible for explaining what groups
they represent and how they propose to represent broader interests. The authors believe that although class certification procedures potentially can provide a substantial assurance of representativeness, they presently are not being utilized to effectuate
this goal. Possibly, the critics are correct in interpreting the lack
of class actions to mean that not all of the interests affected by
the litigation are involved in it. Courts readily granted requests
for intervention either as a party or as amicus. In contradiction
to the assumptions of Professor Chayes' multipolar model, additional parties tended to support with variations the arguments
of the main participants rather than to set out distinct independent perspectives.
Thus, courts appear to be open to broad involvement of all
interested parties, but not all potentially affected groups seek to
participate, and even those groups who do participate do not
present a broad spectrum of strongly diverse views to the courts.
The authors conclude that it may be that the real issues in educational litigations are essentially bipolar and that all interests
are generally being adequately represented. One might conclude,
however, that the inherent bipolar orientation of the adversarial
judicial process discourages a broader multipolar approach.50 It
may be that certain kinds of cases - grooming and speech are bipolar. Certainly, if desegregation cases had been included,
the multipolarity of the sample would have increased. Another
reason for bipolarity of representation is that the issues involved
are essentially bipolar but the remedial phase is multipolar. This
may also explain why judges made decisions on class action allegations after trial."' Perhaps it is only after the factfinding is
developed and a decision reached that parties are even aware
that they may be affected by the court's decision.
Fifty-seven percent of the sample cases were brought by
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
50. REBELL& BLOCK.
supra note 3, at 41.
51. Id. at 37.

Heinonline - - 4 Pace L. Rev. 207 1983-1984

PACE LAW REVIEW

208

[Vol. 4195

public interest attorney^.^' These lawyers brought the more
complex cases involving a greater degree of substantive reform
and were more likely to raise novel or relatively novel legal iss u e ~Public
. ~ ~ interest attorneys generally pick and choose their
cases. The more intricate educational cases with highly novel legal theories are of great interest because of their potentially important ramifications. Because these cases are so highly cost
inefficient and plaintiffs tend to be minorities and poor, only a
specialized public interest attorney 'could possibly afford to
mount such litigation. Furthermore, only public interest attorneys may have the technical and financial resources to litigate
an extensive reform case."' Rebel1 and Block tentatively conclude that public interest attorneys do speak for their clients
rather than promote their own ideological views.66They say that
the real debate is whether it is desirable for society to provide
minority group interests with legal resources to bring major reform cases.66 That may be overdrawing the issue.

C . Factfinding Capability Issues
The study concludes that the adversary process is an effective information gathering technique in social policy litigation^.^'
Where the school board was the defendant, discovery was complete and efficient. Perhaps these defendants were more inclined
to accede to requests for information because of their inherent
public exposure, and the natural public interest in the
Although every case in the sample challenged the systemwide application of an educational policy, in relatively few was
the resolution of conflicting social fact evidence central to the
De-emphasizing social factfinding does not,
court's de~ision.~"
Id. at 43.
Id. at 41-42.
The authors found t h i in Chance. Id. at 114.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 46, 115, 205.
Id. at 206.
Judges often utilized various avoidance devices which allowed for disposal of
plaintiffs claims on the merits without a close scrutiny of the parties' competing social
fact arguments. Id. at 50.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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admit the authors, address the question whether judges have the
capacity to comprehend and decide these issues.60 Quantitative
assessments are resistant to such survey techniques. It should be
pointed out that in school desegregation cases, which were not
included in the study, the use of data may be different. Complicated factfinding is often based upon analysis of asserted causal
hypotheses or controversial data.
Critics of the use of complex social science evidence in educational cases may have underestimated the judiciary's ability to
comprehend this data. At least in this study, judges who did
deal with social fact evidence had little difficulty in obtaining a
working familiarity with these concepts and used them to assess
the credibility of key witnesses. The authors conclude that bbth
the strength and weakness of the courts as a factfinding mechanism depend on the adversary system which is its motivating
force.61 If the opposing parties present a complete record, the
court is equipped to deal with it. If one of the parties fails to
present countervailing arguments or information, a court lacking
an independent specialized knowledge of the area will base its
decision on the facts and arguments before it. Whatever criticisms there are of the ability of the judiciary to engage in
factfinding, Rebell and Block find that courts are much better
equipped than legislatures to evaluate social fact evidence systematically and to render analytically reasoned decision^.^^

D. Remedial Capability
The data rebuts the criticism that the judiciary lacks the
resources, expertise, or perspective needed to implement educational reform successfully. Reform decrees were not used in most
of the cases in which the plaintiffs prevailed because judges,
consistent with traditional canons of judicial caution, attempted
to approve the least expansive vindication of plaintiffs' rights.B3
The degree of compliance by the parties also may impact upon
the scope of the remedy. In many institutional reform cases, recalcitrant defendants oblige the judge to order a wide ranging
60. Id. at 54.
61. Id. at 207.
62. Id. at 209.
63. Id. at 59.
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"reform" decree. In the sample presented, the degree of compliance was higher than one might have expected. The question is
posed whether this affected the type of decree issued.
A study of the factual situation in desegregation cases could
undermine the results of the study. In desegregation cases widespread noncompliance by publicly elected school board officials
and by parents was common. The judge alone remained to implement the decree. Unlike the desegregation cases, with one exception, the courts in the sample did not become fully involved
in the day-to-day administrative policy ramifications of their
orders.
VI. Conclusion
Did the research settle the major issues in the judicial activism debate? Rebel1 and Block found that the courts do not act
in strict accordance with certain assumptions of the classical
separation of powers theory. In public law litigation they operate
in a more political manner than the role contemplated under the
traditional model of court adjudication. Courts have conducted
themselves more than competently in this difficult new area
The defects in judicial performance are not caused by the ineptness of the judiciary compared to other governmental agencies
but by the social, political, and technical characteristics of the
particular controversies."' The authors point to an increased activism in all branches of government and suggest the need to
reformulate the basic issues in the judicial activism controversy.
They also suggest future empirical research to consider the longterm consequences to the courts in terms of the legitimacy of
plunging into social controver~y.~~
This reviewer came away from Educational Policy Making
and the Courts, and specifically from the detailed case studies,
with the belief that the variables attached to a lawsuit are so
random and diffuse that to draw generalities from any sample
requires much more sophisticated statistical analysis than that
which is presented in this empirical study. The authors honestly
share with the reader their own ambiguities on this issue?" Yet,
64. Id. at 214-15.
65. Id. at 216.
66. Id. at 199.
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if quantitative conclusions are at too low a level of generalization, the danger is that they become insignificant. For example,
if all reviewers of this book reduced their answers to a simple
yes or no in response to the question: "Did you like this book,"
we could tabulate a generalization about the book. But how useful or significant would it be? This is not to minimize Rebel1 and
Block's achievement. They are among the first to attempt to link
a coherent theory of the legal process to empirically grounded
research. Hopefully, this important book will encourage the authors and others to continue such research.
A final word of praise is owed to the University of Chicago
Press. In an age when editing and publishing practices are to
traditional standards as organ music at the ball park is to Handel, it should be noted that this is a graphically well designed
and edited book.
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